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I Introduction
High levels of education and early labour market entries are both important for the international competitiveness of economies, but there seems to be a trade-off between the two. This trade-off and the debate on the optimal number of school years is becoming increasingly important as general levels of education increase across OECD countries (OECD, 2015) . A recent school reform in Germany provides novel insights into the possibility of educating children up to the same level of skills over a shorter period of time. German students were among the oldest across all OECD countries to acquire the qualifications needed to study at university. Peers in the UK, the US and Japan typically earn the equivalent qualifications at 17 or 18 years of age (OECD, 2008, p. 498) . In response to this situation, several German federal states reduced the number of years needed to earn the relevant qualification for university entrance (Abitur) at academic-track schools from 13 to 12 years. Unlike straight reductions in years of schooling, the German reform sought to simultaneously maintain high levels of education by increasing the number of instruction hours in the remaining academic-track school years. Consequently, students affected by the reform cover the same school curriculum and are subject to the same total instruction time across their school career as before the reform -despite having a year less schooling. Affected students have longer school days in which they cover curriculum content that has been brought forward from previously higher years.
In this study, we investigate the impact of this controversial and major education reform on student performance in school. Using aggregated administrative data covering the entire population of students in academic-track schools across several cohorts, we analyse the impact on three important measures of overall student performance: grade repetition rates, graduation rates and final grade point averages (GPA). For the identification of effects, we use the fact that the reform was implemented at different points in time across the German federal states. This difference-in-differences setting enables us to account for major concerns in the analysis of grade repetition rates, graduation rates and GPAs, such as differences between education systems, teacher grading biases and general time trends.
We find that the probability of repeating a year throughout academic-track 1 school increases by 3.6 percentage points (26 percent), indicating students' problems with covering more content per school year during longer school days in the remaining school years. The effects are stronger for boys and concentrate in the final years prior to school completion. The reform also reduced the average GPA by about 4.4 percent of a standard deviation. Yet, we do not find evidence of reform effects on the proportion of students completing academic-track schools with the university entrance qualification. The results are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses. We find neither evidence of differential trends in the outcome variables between treatment and control states before the introduction of the G8-reform, nor do we find evidence of changes in the student body due to the reform. Both results strengthen a causal interpretation of our findings.
This study links two strands of the literature on the role of time as an input factor in the educational production process. Previous studies either look at the impact of (i) changes in the amount of instruction time provided in a given school year, or (ii) changes in the number of years of schooling. The first strand finds that expansions in the number of days spent in school (e.g. Marcotte, 2007; Sims, 2008; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Herrmann & Rockoff, 2012) or increases in the number of instruction hours provided in a given time period (e.g. Taylor, 2014; Cortes et al., 2015; Lavy, 2015; Rivkin & Schiman, 2015; Huebener et al., 2016) tend to improve student performance.
Regarding the second strand, there is a large economic literature on the benefits of additional years of schooling (e.g. Card, 1999; Lochner, 2011) . The effects are often identified through changes related to minimum schooling requirements. The findings relate to students on the verge of early school dropout, who experience high monetary and non-monetary returns of additional years of schooling. However, it is not clear what these studies imply for students who are not on the verge of dropping out of school, i.e., students aiming at earning higher school leaving certificates. A policy experiment in Canada provides initial insights into the benefits of additional years of schooling for students bound for higher education. The Canadian reform shortened university preparatory high school by one year. Morin (2013) and Krashinsky (2014) examine the impact of the reform on students' academic performance at university. Both studies find a strong negative effect on student 2 performance ranging between 17 to 120 percent of a standard deviation, with larger reductions in student performance for lower-ability students. This suggests that the missing school year had indeed added substantial value to student performance.
While both more instruction time per school year and more years of schooling seem beneficial for student learning, it is not clear whether the effects of reductions in the number of years of schooling can be fully offset by compensating increases in instruction time over the remaining school years. The German academic-track school reform is the first policy experiment providing us with insights into this question, which is particularly important in understanding the trade-off between high levels of education and early labour market entries. We find some evidence of adverse effects, though these effects appear moderate if compared to the findings of studies analysing complete eliminations of the final year of schooling such as in the Canadian case. Our findings complement the first set of important results by Büttner & Thomsen (2015) , the only other economic study assessing the reform effect on student performance at the end of secondary school.
1 Büttner & Thomsen estimate the reform effect in one out of 13 treatment states for the first affected cohort, using survey data from students in twelve schools and a different econometric approach. They find that the reform resulted in lower final examination results in mathematics, but not in German.
We extend the existing literature in several dimensions. First, we examine three different measures of student performance. Second, while Büttner & Thomsen draw on comparisons between the first treatment cohort and the last pre-treatment cohort to estimate reform effects, we apply an alternative econometric approach to extend the analysis to subsequent treatment cohorts. This is an important refinement as the first treated cohort graduated under particular conditions: Due to the nature of the reform, the first treatment cohort graduated from school in the same year as the last control cohort. Therefore, students in this cohort might have different performance incentives due to the direct comparison with another cohort and the competition for limited resources at universities (e.g. available places, student-teacher-ratio) and for places on vocational training courses. Third, studying several treated cohorts allows us to analyse whether the reform effects are basically transition effects or whether the effects also persist in the medium-run. Fourth, we investigate the reform effect across most treatment states, which allows to control for cohort effects and other education policies. Fifth, we employ administrative data covering the entire underlying population of students. Sixth, this study carries important implications for endogenous sample selection issues in the growing literature on the impact of this education reform on post-secondary education outcomes and on labour market outcomes. The reform effect on grade repetition rates implies that in each affected cohort, the share of students repeating a year is higher. Depending on the sample selection of the researcher, this affects the ability distribution in treatment and control cohorts, thus potentially posing challenges for an unbiased estimation of reform effects. This is less relevant for studies that sample students before grade 10, as we only find reform effects on grade repetitions in later grades. Further, the zero-reform-effect on the graduation rate suggests that a compositional change in the group of students with the qualifications for university entrance is not an important source for sample selection biases.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section II provides information on the German education system and the reform analysed in this study.
Section III describes the data, while the empirical strategy is outlined in section IV. Section V reports the reform effects, followed by a broad range of sensitivity checks in section VI. Section VII investigates effect heterogeneities and section VIII concludes.
II Institutional background and the G8-reform
We derive the effects of compressing instruction time on student performance from a reform to German academic-track schools. The German education system tracks students into different school types, typically at around ten years of age, after four years of joint primary schooling. The high-ability, academic-track school Gymnasium prepares students for university education. This track is the primary 4 route for students to earn their Abitur, the general university entrance qualification in Germany. About one third of each cohort attends a Gymnasium.
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Historically, academic-track students in Germany typically earned their university entrance qualification around the age of 19 or 20 -which is comparably late (OECD, 2008) . In response to this, several federal states implemented a reform (known as G8), which reduced the number of years spent in academic-track schools by one year. As a result of the reform, students could earn the university entrance qualification in a total of 12 rather than 13 years of schooling, which corresponds to eight years of academic-track schooling (G8) rather than nine years (G9). At the same time, the reform sought to maintain high levels of education. It increased the number of instruction hours from grades 5 to 12 to provide students with (i) the same curriculum and (ii) the same minimum number of total instruction hours until graduation (KMK, 2013) . This is a unique feature of the German G8-reform compared to policies in other countries changing the number of years of schooling.
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Following the reform, the number of weekly instruction hours was higher, and curriculum content is taught earlier in a student's school career. There were no other simultaneous and substantive changes: the number of school holidays, the criteria for moving to the next school year, and the performance requirements for earning the university entrance qualification remained the same. The G8-reform was implemented by 13 out of 16 federal states between 2001 and 2007 (see Table 1 ).
Generally, the reform affected cohorts newly entering academic track schools after primary school. These cohorts had to comply with new timetable regulation, passed by the federal state education ministries, which differ from the timetable regulations previous cohorts had to comply with. 
III Data
We use national administrative data and examine grade repetition rates, academictrack school graduation rates, and final grade point averages (GPAs) as indicators of student performance. Germany does not conduct national standardised final school assessments. Consequently, we deem the indicators employed for the current analysis to be the best nationwide measures of student performance upon graduation.
Information is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (2015a) and by the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK, 2015) , the assembly of the 16 federal state ministers of education.
The administrative data have three main advantages. First, they cover the full student population at academic-track schools. Second, the data are reported annually, thus making it possible to use the regional and temporal variations to identify the G8-reform effects. Third, information about grade repetitions, graduations and final GPAs are reported by the schools to the statistical offices and education ministries. Non-response and social desirability bias are not an issue. The data also have some shortcomings however. Generally, the data is only available in aggregated form at the cohort-state level, so we cannot link individuals across different outcomes.
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There are also no socio-economic background variables available in the data. This limits the options for exploring respective effect heterogeneities. Also, we cannot distinguish between students of the first affected cohort and the last pre-treatment cohort in the aggregated data, as these students leave school in the same year. The federal state of Hesse introduced the reform over a period of three years, and we also cannot distinguish between treated and untreated students of these cohorts in the data. Hesse is therefore excluded from our analysis. Further, the number of observations differs between the three outcome variables (see below) because some states did not provide the relevant information in specific years and because of changes in reporting regulations for one outcome variable. In order to increase the power of our analysis for each outcome we include as many observations as possible. Yet, the results are also robust to using different sample restrictions.
In the following, we describe the three analysed outcome variables and the resulting samples. Summary statistics of the main outcome variables are reported in Table 2 .
A. Grade repetition rate
As a first measure for student performance, we follow Lee & Barro (2001) and Pischke (2007) , and employ grade repetition rates as an indicator of students' ability to cope with the increase in the number of weekly instruction hours. Students in Germany need to fulfil certain learning objectives before moving on to the next school year. If they do not meet these objectives, they are required to repeat the year, or to move to a lower school track. 7 We observe grade repetition rates at academic-track schools for each federal state and each grade from the 1994/95 to the 2012/13 school years. For our main analysis, we aggregate this grade-specific information for each graduation cohort and federal state in order to get a measure of a cohort's overall grade repetition rate throughout academic-track schooling. We sum up the number of students repeating a year from grade 7 until school completion, and divide this by the cohort size in grade 7 at academic-track schools. This gives us the aggregated grade repetition probability. We base our calculations on the number of students in grade 7 rather than grade 5 as this is the first school year in which tracking has taken place in all federal states. We multiply the ratio by 100 for an immediate percentage point interpretation of the coefficients in the results tables. Note that for G8, grade repetitions are summed up over six academic years, while for G9, they are summed up over seven years as the time to school completion is shorter. We examine the grade-specific reform effect in section VII.
The federal state of Lower Saxony lacks information on grade repetitions for the final three years of academic-track school. This federal state is therefore excluded from the analyses for this outcome. The main sample for the analysis of grade repetition rates consists of 168 state-cohort observations, containing information from the 2002 to 2013 graduation cohorts across 14 federal states.
B. Graduation rate
As a second measure for student performance, we analyse the graduation rate as a frequently-used measure for the effectiveness of schooling (see e.g. Evans & Schwab, 1995; Lochner & Moretti, 2004 ). This measure is informative about whether the reform had an impact on the current number of students in the economy who left secondary school with university entrance qualifications. Fewer graduates ultimately reduce the number of students allowed to enrol in university.
We observe the total number of students who earned their university entrance qualification Abitur from academic-track schools, aggregated by school year and federal state. As the absolute number of academic-track school graduates depends on the size of the respective birth cohorts, we divide this number by the respective average cohort size of 18 to 20 year olds living in the federal state. This information is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (2015b). Again, we multiply the share by 100. In the robustness section of this paper, we perform several sensitivity checks on our findings to calculate the graduation rate with alternative normalisations.
The main sample for the analysis of graduation rates consists of 180 state-cohort observations, containing information from the 2002 to 2013 graduation cohorts across 15 federal states.
C. Grade point average
As a third measure of student performance, we use the mean final grade point average (GPA) of students achieving the university entrance qualification (Abitur).
In Germany, the GPA serves as the main criterion in the university admission process, and is also a reliable predictor of university success (Trapmann et al., 2007) and labour market outcomes (Piopiunik et al., 2014) .
In Germany, GPAs are calculated based on the grades received in school ex- We use information on the frequency distribution of GPAs obtained from the KMK (2015), and compute mean GPAs by graduation cohort and federal state.
The data contain information on all students being awarded the Abitur, i.e. on students from the academic-track schools affected by the reform, as well as students from alternative school tracks that are not affected by the reform, but in which the general university entrance qualification can also be earned. While the majority of students covered by this data graduates from academic-track schools, 20 percent of students earn their Abitur from alternative school tracks, namely from the German version of comprehensive schools (Integrierte Gesamtschulen) or from schools with a vocational training focus (Berufsschulen). The inclusion of students unaffected by the reform in our data introduces a potential attenuation bias to estimated reform effects. In robustness checks reported in section VI.B, we employ two different strategies to develop an idea of the extent of this attenuation bias. We find that the attenuation bias ultimately does not change our conclusions.
For ease of interpretation, we standardise the mean GPA using the mean and the standard deviation of the GPA distribution in our main sample and invert the scale so that higher values indicate better grades. horts, but changes in reporting regulations created a structural break in the data that makes us less convinced by the legitimacy of this information for our analyses.
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We perform a robustness check in section VI.B. Note that the reform effect on the GPA is the result of a combination of the compression of instruction time into fewer years of schooling and the resulting younger age-at-test of students. This joint effect is of significant relevance to policy-makers as the final GPA is a measure of the students' educational performance and a good indicator of students' preparation for post-secondary education paths.
IV Empirical strategy
To identify G8-reform effects, we make use of the fact that the reform was implemented at different points in time across the federal states. We exploit this variation with a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. We estimate the G8-reform effect on grade repetition rates, graduation rates and GPAs as dependent variables y using the following model:
G8 sc is a binary variable that indicates whether graduation cohort c in federal state s is affected by the G8-reform. β is the coefficient of core interest and identifies the G8-reform effect. μ s captures general, cohort-invariant differences in the outcome variables between federal states, such as state-specific requirements for grade repetitions, state differences in grading policies, or state differences in the level of difficulty of final exams. State-fixed effects also account for a large share of the time-invariant component in a potential teacher bias in the outcome variables, as the labour market for teachers is very persistent over time. κ c captures general changes in the outcome variables across cohorts, as well as shocks common to all federal states. The na-tionwide abolition of compulsory military service, birth cohort effects, or general changes in grading over time (such as grade inflation) are thereby accounted for. δ captures the effect of the double graduation cohort (DGC), consisting of students from the first treatment cohort and students from the final pre-treatment cohort. As the G8-reform cuts one year of schooling, both cohorts leave school simultaneously.
The data do not allow us to distinguish between these students and we therefore assign this group neither to the treatment group nor to the control group. It is also important to note that this double graduation cohort is a special case as it is roughly double the size of a regular cohort, with students competing for resources at universities (e.g. available places, student-teacher-ratio), and for places on vocational training courses and volunteer programmes. This might alter performance incentives for students compared to other cohorts (Morin, 2015a,b) .
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In the results section, our baseline model will gradually be extended by further control variables. This serves two main purposes. First, it relaxes the common trend assumption, a key assumption of our identification strategy. Second, it allows us to check for the orthogonality of the G8-reform indicator to other factors. In the first extension of the model, we include a vector X sc with economic control variables.
Several studies document the impact of business cycles on educational decisions, such as grade repetitions, university enrolment and university graduation (see e.g. Edwards, 1976; Gaini et al., 2013) . We therefore include GDP growth and the general unemployment rate (German Federal Statistical Office, 2015b) measured in the year prior to graduation to account for changes in federal states' economic environments that might impact the dynamic path of our outcome variables across federal states. Furthermore, children born in eastern Germany shortly after the fall of the Wall are also included in our sample. These cohorts experienced a unprecedented decline in overall fertility rates (Goldstein & Kreyenfeld, 2011) , with evidence of adverse parental selection in these cohorts (Chevalier & Marie, 2016) . Hence, we indicate observations of eastern German cohorts born up to two years after the fall of the Wall with a separate dummy variable, with birth calculations based on regular school duration until graduation.
The model is flexible enough to check for the potentially confounding role of other education reforms that are not captured by state-or cohort-fixed effects. We include a vector P sc of binary variables for other significant education reforms passed by some federal states during the sampling period. None of the policy changes considered are collinear to the G8-reform (see Table 1 ). The first relevant change is the introduction of centralised school leaving examinations, in which school leaving exams are designed by federal state institutions rather than by the schools themselves. This development may impact student performance (see e.g. Jürges et al., 2005) . Furthermore, some federal states combined the middle-ability (Realschule) and low-ability track (Hauptschule) in the German three-tier system into a single alternative school track. This could impact the school track choice, and thereby the student composition within tracks (see e.g. Bauer & Riphahn, 2006; Malamud & Pop-Eleches, 2011) . Finally, the subject choices in the final years of academic-track schooling were reduced in some federal states, which might also affect our outcomes (see e.g. Görlitz & Gravert, 2016) .
The remaining variation in the outcomes is captured by the error term ε sc . In difference-in-differences settings, a general problem is that ε sc might be correlated within federal states (Bertrand et al., 2004) . A common way of dealing with this correlation structure in the error term is to cluster standard errors at the federal state level. However, this procedure requires a sufficiently large number of clusters (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p. 319 
V Results
The estimation results of the empirical model in equation 1 are reported in Table 3 . Panel A provides the estimates on the grade repetition rate. The baseline difference-in-differences specification in column 1 only includes the G8-treatment 11 We rely on a specification with Mammen weights, 1,000 replications, and testing under H 0 .
12 indicator, federal state-, time-and double cohort-fixed effects, and suggests an increase in the grade repetition rate of 4.3 percentage points. However, the statistical power is low, a common phenomenon in difference-in-differences regressions (Brewer et al., 2013 ). Yet, the gradual addition of further control variables, X sc and P sc increases the precision of our estimates. In our main specification in column 3, the G8-reform increases the grade repetition rate at academic-track schools by 3.6 percentage points, or 26 percent. 12 The effect is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, irrespective of whether the conventional clustering or the wild cluster bootstrapping procedure is used to calculate p-values. This result provides empirical evidence that an increased number of students fails to satisfy the required learning goals. The reform increased weekly instruction hours to cover additional curriculum content. Weaker students on the verge of repeating a school year may encounter difficulties understanding the increased volume of curriculum content in each school year. Huebener et al. (2016) analyse the G8-reform effect on the performance of students in grade 9. They find that low-performing students benefit least from the increased classroom time, which could explain the increase in grade repetition rates typically occurring among the weakest students.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the G8-reform effect on graduation rates. Across all three model specifications, the effect estimates are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This suggests that despite increased grade repetition rates, the likelihood to graduate from an academic-track school with the university entrance qualification is not affected. The findings are somewhat in contrast to Eide & Showalter (2001) and Jacob & Lefgren (2009) , who provide evidence that grade repetitions also reduce high school completion rates. Compared to these studies, in our case those students repeating a school year have a strong performance incentive to leave school with the university entrance qualification, as this qualification is a prerequisite for entering university education. Second, there is evidence that the completion of school degrees, rather than the number of years of schooling, seem to determine labour market outcomes in Germany (Pischke & von Wachter, 2008) .
Third, our study does not analyse the general student population but only students 12 Calculations of percentage changes are based on the counterfactual for the treatment group in the treatment period, i.e. E(y|G8 = 1, post = 1) −β.
on the (high-ability) academic track. Table 3 reports the G8-reform effect on the GPA. The baseline difference-in-differences estimate for the mean GPA is -6.9 percent of a standard deviation. When the full set of control variables is included (X sc and P sc ), the coefficient is -4.4 percent of a standard deviation. However, the estimated reform effects are attenuated as our data also includes approximately 20 percent of students from alternative school tracks that were not affected by the G8-reform.
Panel C of
13 Increased grade repetition rates may also slightly attenuate the estimated reform effect on the GPA, if repeating a school year improves student performance.
The shortened school duration was accompanied by proportionate increases in instruction hours, such that the total instruction time and the school curriculum provided to students remained the same. Nevertheless, the estimated reform effects imply that students' performance is poorer: grade repetition rates increase and GPAs decline. There are at least two explanations that can rationalise the findings. First, fatigue and the declining concentration of students over the extended school days may diminish the benefits of additional instruction time on a given day (Rivkin & Schiman, 2015) . Second, students may lack the maturity or fail to carry out sufficient preparation to enable them to process the curriculum content that now appears relatively earlier in their academic careers. Findings from a high school programme in the US support this argument. As a consequence of teaching more difficult algebra courses in middle school rather than in high school, Allensworth et al. (2009) and Clotfelter et al. (2015) find negative effects on student performance in later mathematics courses. Overall, our findings are in line with Büttner & Thomsen (2015) , who analyse the G8-reform effect on final exam grades in mathematics and languages. Such final exam grades are one component in the final GPA that we analyse.
Although we find evidence of negative effects on student performance, the economic significance of the effects seems small for three reasons. First, it should be acknowledged that the majority of students successfully graduates in the shorter period of time. A rather small proportion of students cope with the increased learn-ing intensity by repeating a school year, but ultimately also graduates with the university entrance qualification. As a consequence of the reform, academic-track school graduates are, on average, 0.86 years or 10.4 months younger (see Table A .1 in the appendix). Second, note that the observed effects on GPAs also include ageat-test effects to the disadvantage of treatment cohorts, due to the nature of the policy experiment. Third, if the effects are compared to effects of a reform in Ontario, Canada, which abolished the final year of high school without compensating by providing students with increased instruction time in earlier grades, the effect of the German reform on the GPA is much smaller. Depending on the group of students, performance at university declined by between 17 and 120 percent of a standard deviation in the Canadian case, with low-performing students suffering the most (Morin, 2013; Krashinsky, 2014) . The effects for Canada might even be lower-bound estimates as they are estimated in the group of students moving on to university and not for the entire group of affected students at the end of high school.
Even if we account for the attenuation bias in our analyses, the largest fall in the GPA that we find is less than 10 percent of a standard deviation.
If we now use our results to project G8-reform effects on students' university success and labour market outcomes, we would expect the effects on these outcomes also to be moderately negative. First studies examine the G8-reform effects on postsecondary education decisions and university performance, and indeed these studies find only small effects. Meyer et al. (2015) and Meyer & Thomsen (2016) find that some students delay the start of university by one year. By the second year after graduation, the effects on the transition to university have almost vanished. They also find no effects on university subject choices. Dörsam & Lauber (2015) find no G8-reform effect on the academic performance of students enrolled at one university. However, the study excludes grade repeaters from the sample and focusses on students who enrolled to university within 1.5 years after school graduation. As we show that the G8-reform increased repetition rates, the sample used by Dörsam & Lauber (2015) may induce an upward bias in the estimated reform effects that consequently hides negative effects of the G8-reform on student performance at university. We conclude that redistributing instruction hours and the school curriculum over fewer school years cannot entirely compensate for the deterioration in student performance caused by reductions in the years of schooling, but the adverse effects are rather small.
VI Sensitivity checks

A. Threats to the identification strategy
This section deals with the two main assumptions of our identification strategy required for the consistency of the estimated reform effects: the common trend assumption and the absence of reform-induced compositional changes.
With respect to the common trend assumption, our data contain a series of pretreatment observations that allow us to simulate different placebo reforms within our empirical model. We pretend that the reform would have taken place one to four years before the actual reform, and so we drop all treatment observations from our sample and substitute the G8-treatment indicator in equation 1 by placebo reform indicators one at a time. These tests can reveal whether treatment and control states followed different time trends prior to the treatment. The estimation results for these placebo treatments are reported in Table 4 (see columns 2-5). All coefficients are small in magnitude and insignificant. As an alternative check for the common trend assumption, we substitute the set of control variables (X sc and P sc ) in equation 1 with linear state-specific time trends (see column 6). Also this specification confirms the main pattern in our findings. Co-treatments because of other education reforms may also violate the common trend assumption. Note, however, that our findings are very similar irrespective of whether we include or exclude controls for other significant education reforms (compare columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 ). In sum, the specifications presented here support the assumption of a common time trend in student performance of treatment and control states in the absence of treatment.
The second key assumption is that the G8-reform had no impact on the composition of the group of students in treatment and control states. Federal states that implemented the reform passed new regulations regarding the length of academictrack schooling, and all academic-track schools were obliged to comply with the regulation. Students trying to avoid the reform had to (i) opt for a lower school track or (ii) move to another state that had not (yet) implemented the reform.
Choosing a lower school track has lasting consequences. Academic-track schools are the most common way of earning the qualification required for university education.
Commuting or moving to other federal states entails high costs for the child and its family, and becomes even less feasible as more and more federal states implement the reform. Any behaviour of avoiding academic-track schools should become evident from enrolment rates in academic-track schools. We explicitly check for G8-reform effects on the share of grade 7 students enrolled in academic-track schools by using the ratio between the number of grade 7 students enrolled in academic-track schools and the total number of grade 7 students across all school tracks as an outcome variable in equation 1. There is no evidence for the G8-reform having an impact on the share of a cohort enrolled in academic-track schools (see Table A .1 in the appendix).
Further, it may be that students still enrol in academic-track schools, but switch to lower school tracks later. First, it is important to note that moving between school tracks is generally very rare. In the school year 2012/2013, 2.4 percent of all students switched between different school types (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2014). Second, Huebener et al. (2016) attempt to find group compositional changes of students in grade 9 at academic-track schools in representative PISA data and do not find any evidence of G8-reform-related changes in student composition by gender, parental education, migration background and age. Third, any drop in the share of students attending academic-track schools would translate into lower Abitur graduation rates. Our findings, however, suggest a zero-reform effect on the graduation rate. In sum, the evidence collected suggests that selective migration to lower school tracks or other federal states is unlikely to be an important source of bias for our findings.
B. Model specifications
This section explores the sensitivity of the findings to different model specifications. First, we check whether our findings could primarily be caused by implementation effects, such as a lack of experience with the redistributed curriculum and the new learning environment. In column 7 of Table 4 , we include a separate dummy variable for the first two treatment cohorts to remove these cohorts from the treatment group. Our findings remain unchanged. In the next specification, we examine the role of exceptional circumstances in the introduction of the reform in the federal states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The first three treatment cohorts in Saxony-Anhalt were in grades 7 to 9, and the first two treatment cohorts in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern were in grades 7 to 8 when they were assigned to G8.
Consequently, the additional workload has been redistributed over fewer remaining years for these "surprised" cohorts, which could affect the results. In column 8 of Table 4 , we incorporate a dummy indicating these cohorts and find that controlling for these circumstances does not alter our conclusions.
Further, we examine the sensitivity of the results to different ways of accounting for the double graduation cohort. First, we exclude them completely. We lose one cohort for each treatment state. Second, we interact the federal state dummies with the double graduation cohort dummies. The results are reported in columns 9 and 10 of Table 4 . The method of dealing with the double cohort also has no impact on our findings.
While in our main specification we normalise the number of graduates with the average cohort size of the 18-20-year-old individuals, Table A .2 in the appendix shows that our results are insensitive to working with alternative normalisations.
The next set of sensitivity checks concerns only the GPA. The first two robustness checks address the aforementioned attenuation bias in the estimates (see columns 2 and 3 of Table A .3 in the appendix). Approximately 20 percent of the students in the GPA data earned their university entrance qualification from alternative school tracks which were not subject to the G8-reform. First, we interact the G8-treatment indicator with the share of graduates from academic-track schools among all students leaving with the university entrance qualification. Thereby, the treatment effect is scaled by the actual share of treated students in the cell. In the second test, we exclude observations from the three treatment states with the highest shares of Abitur graduates from alternative school tracks: Baden-Württemberg (31 percent), Berlin (30 percent) and Hamburg (28 percent). As we would expect, in both specifications the point estimates increase, but the magnitude of the attenuation bias does not alter our conclusion on small overall reform effects on the final GPA. The next sensitivity check addresses the structural break in the reporting of aggregated 
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C. Construct validity of the outcome variables
The validity of the employed outcomes as indicators of student performance would be compromised if the outcomes were prone to policy-makers' manipulation.
There are several reasons why this manipulation is unlikely to play a major role in the present case. First, it is important to note that education policy in Germany is decentralised and in the responsibility of the 16 federal states. Isolated attempts of policy-makers to affect the outcome variables are unlikely to have an impact on our findings as we identify treatment effects across several treatment states.
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Concerted actions across federal states are unlikely as this is something the general public would have noticed. Second, we are not looking at a single measure of student performance but at three different measures. None of these measures can be manipulated by policy-makers alone. Decisions on grade repetitions are made by each individual school and are therefore highly decentralised. Further, we did not find any evidence of official instructions to change grade repetition rates as part of the reform. Also graduation rates cannot be systematically manipulated by policy-makers. Graduating from an academic-track school requires a student to meet graduation requirements and these were not changed by the G8-reform. Some federal states introduced centralised exit examinations or restricted subject choices in the final two years at academic-track schools (see Table 1 ), but we accounted for the potential confounding effect of these reforms in our main specification. The final GPA is calculated based on two components. The first are grades earned in class during the final two years at academic-track schools. These grades are awarded at 14 We also looked at the G8-reform effect at various quantiles of the GPA distribution. These unreported regressions did not provide evidence of differential effects across the GPA distribution. Note, however, that the GPA is only observed for successful candidates. The estimated effects at the bottom of the GPA distribution may therefore be confounded by catch-up effects of grade repetitions on GPAs. Moreover, ceiling effects on the GPA measure may also hide differential effects across the GPA distribution.
15 Our main findings are robust to excluding individual federal states from the regressions. The estimation results are available from the authors on request.
the class level and it would therefore be very difficult for policy-makers to manipulate them. The second component in the final GPA is the grades earned in final school exit examinations. Attempts by individual states to make school exit examinations easier are unlikely to have a major impact on our findings as we identify reform effects across several federal states. If, bearing the aforementioned in mind, policy-makers were still able to impact our measures of student performance, it is likely that our estimated reform effects would be attenuated.
D. External validity
The regional and temporal variations in the implementation of the reform arguably provide good internal validity of our findings. The robustness tests support this notion. Can our findings also be transferred to other contexts, however? Firstly, it is important to note that we use data capturing the universe of academic-track school students in the German states. We therefore estimate the average G8-reform effect for the affected cohorts in our sample. One question is whether the treatment effects will differ for future treatment cohorts. Policy experiments carry the risk of observed effects being only transitory implementation effects, e.g. because of learning effects of school administrations, teachers and students. It should be borne in mind here that the first cohort, part of the double graduation cohort, does not contribute to identifying our reform effects. For this cohort the performance incentives might be exceptional (Morin, 2015a,b) . Further, the overall number of instruction hours taught at a given school increased only during the transition phase, when both G8 and G9 cohorts attended that school. In order to cope with this transitory increase in overall instruction hours, schools could extend the teaching load of existing teachers or hire new teachers.
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To shed light on the transitory nature of the effects, we examine the evolution of the treatment effects over time. For this purpose, we interact the G8-treatment dummy with dummy variables for each year after the implementation of the reform to estimate the reform effect separately for cohorts following after the implementation of the reform. Table 5 reports the results. The pattern in the results across cohorts is very similar to our main findings. However, the degrees of freedom to identify the main treatment effects are now distributed across five cohorts. This reduces the statistical power, such that some of the effects are insignificant. Overall, the effects do not appear to be only of a transitory nature, indicating that they will also translate to subsequent cohorts.
Another question to consider is what would happen if other states implemented a similar reform reducing the length of schooling and increasing the instruction hours in the remaining school years to compensate for the shortened school duration. Though one can only speculate about this type of external validity without further insights from other contexts, we believe that such a reform would also have similar consequences elsewhere. One likely reason for our finding of weaker school performance is that students may benefit at a diminishing rate from additional instruction hours on longer school days. Rivkin & Schiman (2015) provide evidence of such diminishing benefits of additional instruction hours in international PISA data, which suggests that this is not specific to the German reform. Furthermore, covering additional curriculum content in a shorter period of time on longer school days may overstretch at least some students. Students have less time outside school hours to process and understand the material and revise for tests and exams and they may not be prepared well enough to cope with the new curriculum content. Allensworth et al. (2009) and Clotfelter et al. (2015) show that shifting curriculum content from later school years to earlier years can have negative effects on student performance if students are not ready for this content. Overtaxing students is also a reason that is likely to apply across institutional contexts. Finally, we cannot entirely rule out that G8-students covered less material than G9-students, or not in the same depth, as weaker students may request repeated explanations of classroom material more often. Such behaviour does also not seem to be specific to the German context.
Based on these considerations, we believe that, also in other countries, a redistribution of instruction hours to earlier school years cannot entirely compensate for reductions in the years of schooling.
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VII Effect heterogeneities
This section analyses how the effect on grade repetition rates is distributed across grades, and whether average treatment effects mask effect heterogeneities by gender.
A. By grade level
The data on grade repetitions allow us to differentiate the reform effect by grade levels. As the increase in instruction hours and learning intensity occurred across all grades in academic-track school, this analysis sheds some light on whether learning deficiencies accumulate over time.
For the estimation of grade-specific effects, we adjust equation 1 by interacting the G8-indicator with dummies for each grade in academic-track school. We additionally include grade-fixed effects, grade-state-fixed effects and grade-cohort-fixed effects. As we use the disaggregated data, the previous sample size of N = 168 increases to N · 6 = 1008 observations.
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As between grade 7 and school completion there are seven school years for G9-students but only six years for G8-students, we have to drop one grade under the G9-regime for a grade-to-grade comparison. We always compare grades 7-9, and the final two years at academic-track schools, as they constitute the years in which students earn grades that count towards the final GPA (qualification phase 1 and 2, denoted by Q1 and Q2 ). Less clear is whether grade 10 in the new G8-regime should be compared to the previous grade 10, or to the previous grade 11, as its new role comprises institutional characteristics of both. We report both comparisons in Table 6 .
We find no significant effects on grade repetition rates in grades 7 to 9, but significant effects in the final years at academic-track school. The effect size and the significance in grade 10 depends on the comparison group. The relative effect sizes on grade repetition rates increase with grades. This concentration of increased grade repetition rates in the final years of schooling supports the idea of accumulated learning deficits of students. The reform extended students' school days and covered additional curriculum content in the extra time. Weaker students on the verge of repeating a school year may have accumulated learning deficits across the different grades. While in grades 7 to 9, to a certain extent, it is still at the discretion of the teachers as to whether or not students are pushed on to the next grade, this scope for the teacher to affect the students' progress into the next year declines as learning deficits increase and as centralised exams begin to feature.
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B. By gender
A broad, interdisciplinary literature documents gender gaps in school achievements. Biological differences in brain structures, brain functioning and hormonal levels (see e.g. Cahill, 2006) , differences in socialisation (see e.g. Bertrand & Pan, 2013) or differences in personality and non-cognitive skills (see e.g. Spinath, 2014) may also cause a differential impact of the G8-reform on girls and boys, because they may differ in their capacity to concentrate on longer school days or to organise their activities within the tighter time schedule, for example. Table 7 reports the estimated G8-effects on grade repetition rates and graduation rates separately by gender. The GPA information is not available separately by gender. Boys exhibit higher absolute reform-induced increases in grade repetition rates than girls. This is in line with findings by Büttner & Thomsen (2015) who find larger negative effects on boys' performance in final mathematics exams. However, considering the original level of grade repetition rates for boys and girls, we find that the relative impact of the reform on grade repetition rates is almost equal. The G8-reform effect on graduation rates is close to zero and insignificant for both boys and girls, indicating no important differences by gender.
VIII Conclusion
This paper examines the effects on student performance of an education reform in Germany that shortened academic-track schooling by one year, and increased instruction hours in the remaining years at academic-track schools to provide the same total instruction time and school curriculum. Our results suggest that compressing instruction time into fewer years of schooling has adverse effects on educational performance. Some students cope with the increased learning intensity by repeating a school year, especially boys and students in the final years of academic-track schooling. However, graduation rates are not affected by the G8-reform. The effect estimates on the GPA are consistently negative, and we argue that several potential sources of attenuation bias strengthen our conclusions on the lower educational performance of students at the end of their school careers. This suggests that the students affected have a poorer command of the school material than peers who covered the same material over a longer period of time. These effects are not only of a transitory nature, but are also apparent five years after the introduction of the G8-reform.
Although we find adverse effects on student performance, we argue that the effects are moderate in economic terms. The majority of students affected graduates one year earlier. A small proportion of students deals with the increased learning intensity by repeating a school year, but ultimately also completes school successfully. The effect on the GPA is also small if compared to the high school reform in Ontario, Canada in which the final year was abolished without compensating for the loss in instruction time in the remaining school years.
The potential costs of the reform due to adverse effects on student performance must be weighed against the economic gains from earlier labour market entries that can mitigate skilled worker shortages, increase social security contributions and raise individuals' lifetime earnings. Compressing instruction time into fewer years of schooling may therefore constitute a previously undiscussed policy option for economies where upper secondary schooling is comparably long. 
(8) Notes: The table reports the G8-reform effect on the graduation age and the share of students enrolled at academic-track schools in grade 7. All models are based on the specification outlined in equation 1. For graduation age, the potential 180 state-cohort observations (15 federal states over 12 years) fall to 167 observations as we lack information about the graduation age for the pre-treatment years 2002-2005 in Brandenburg, Hamburg and Baden-Württemberg as well as for Lower Saxony in 2007. For each graduation cohort in each state, the mean graduation age is calculated based on information on the graduates' distribution of birth years. The drop in the graduation age is statistically different from -1, the reduction by one full year as indicated by the p-value of the test β = −1. The second outcome is computed by dividing the number of students enrolled in academic-track schools in grade 7 by the total number of students in grade 7 enrolled in any school track. This ratio is then multiplied by 100. The source of all this information is the German Federal Statistical Office (2015a). P-values obtained from wild cluster bootstrapping are reported in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (5) normalises by the size of the graduation cohort at school entry.
As the data does not contain information on school entries for the 2002 cohort, the sample size drops by one observation per state for this specification. Column (6) normalizes by the size of the graduation cohort, when the cohort was in grade 7. All models are based on the specification outlined in equation 1. Pvalues obtained from wild cluster bootstrapping are reported in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
